Trade Union Friends of Israel

Madrid

The aftermath of the First Gulf War led to an increased US role in the region, giving a significant impetus to diplomatic moves to bring about peace between Israel and its neighbours. After frantic shuttle diplomacy a regional peace conference for Israel and its neighbours was convened on October 30th 1991 in Madrid. The conference marked the first time that Israeli and Palestinian representatives would meet in an official setting. However due to Israeli objections the Palestinian team was initially formally a part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and consisted of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza without open PLO association including Saeb Erekat, Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, who were in fact in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunis. The purpose of the conference was to serve as an opening forum for the participants and had no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. However it is an important first step that led to later Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria.

Oslo

The election of Yitzhak Rabin and a Labor led coalition at the 1992 Israeli election was a major boost to the search for a negotiated settlement to the region’s problems. With support from the US and Norway secret talks were held between Israel and the PLO, that led to the historic Oslo Accords. The Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, were finalized in Oslo Norway on August 20, 1993 and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993, with Mahmoud Abbas signing for the PLO and Shimon Peres signing for Israel. The event was witnessed by Rabin and Arafat who were persuaded to shake hands by President Clinton, providing the iconic image of the event. The Accords paved the way for the creation of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO leadership’s return to the West Bank and Gaza, and further rounds of negotiations aimed at reaching a final status solution to the conflict. Subsequently in 1994 Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty between the two countries. However all did not run smoothly as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who rejected the accords, launched a wave of suicide bombings and other attacks in an attempt to undermine the peace process, whilst hard-line Israeli settlers attacked Palestinians in an attempt to further destabilise the situation. Despite the upsurge in violence, Israel and the PLO negotiated the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip on September 28 1995, often known as Oslo II. The agreement was designed to increase the area of land controlled by the Palestinian Authority and enhance security co-operation between the two sides but only managed to pass a Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) vote by 2 votes.

On November 4th 2005 a shockwave hit Israeli society when Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated at a peace rally in Tel Aviv’s Israel Kings Square (now renamed Rabin Square), by a right wing fanatic Yigal Amir. Rabin’s death is now seen as a pivotal moment in the peace process, as despite the political difficulties he was facing prior to his death no other leader of the Israeli Peace Camp had his security credentials or popularity with the Israeli public. Rabin’s long-time friend and rival Shimon Peres took over as Prime Minister but he was soon undermined by further terror attacks in Israel and military escalation in Lebanon. In the 1996 election Peres was narrowly defeated by Binyamin Netanyahu by 1% of the vote for the Prime Ministership despite Labor winning 2 more seats than Netanyahu’s Likud party.

Stagnation and Wye River

Following Netanyahu’s election, progress towards full implementation of the 1995 Interim agreement stalled, with the exception of a small withdrawal from Hebron in 1997. Netanyahu sited a range of issues including PA arms stocks and police numbers over the agreed levels in order to prevent further withdrawals from the West Bank and by the summer of 1998 stagnation and pessimism had set in. The Clinton administration placed immense pressure on the parties to make progress. The result of that pressure was a meeting at Wye River Plantation in Maryland between Netanyahu and Arafat that lead to a memorandum issued on 23rd October 1998 that laid out plans to fully implement the territorial withdrawals and technical issues outlined in 1995. Although small steps were made including the opening of an international airport in Gaza for a brief period, most of the points raised at Wye River remain unfulfilled.

Although Netanyahu’s concessions to international pressure were small they did however place his ruling coalition under severe strain from groups believing he had gone back on earlier pledges not to implement the agreements. His flashy presentational style was also proving unpopular with voters.

Netanyahu was defeated in the Prime Ministerial election on May 17th 1999 by Labor leader Ehud Barak, with Labor managing to form a large (but ultimately unstable) coalition. Barak’s election brought new hope to the struggling peace process. Barak, aided and pushed by Clinton, attempted to make progress with the Palestinians, whilst simultaneously attempting to revive dialogue with Syria and make moves to withdraw from Southern Lebanon.

On May 24th 2000 Israel unilaterally withdrew from Southern Lebanon, in the absence of a negotiated settlement with the Lebanese and Syrian governments. The Barak government suffered some political fall out from this action, widely seen as rushed and poorly executed, with Hezbollah fighters quickly filling positions vacated by the IDF and harrying retreating troops. Despite the criticism, Barak’s attention switched to the Palestinian track with critical final status talks at Camp David in Maryland.

Camp David

The failed final status negotiations at Camp David that took place on July 11th -24th 2000 are seen by most observers as marking the end of the Oslo era. Despite intense pressure from the Clinton administration, Barak and Arafat were unable to reach a final deal, leading to both sides trading accusations and blaming each other for the collapse of the talks.

The talks began with both sides far apart on key issues including the future of refugees, control of Jerusalem and territory for a Palestinian State. The initial Israeli proposals aimed to maintain an Israeli a temporary Israeli security presence in large sections of the Jordan Valley and would have effectively separated the West Bank into three sectors. However during the negotiations the Israeli positions changed, enlarging the area for a Palestinian State and accepting Palestinian control of East Jerusalem and the non-Jewish sectors of the Old City. The Clinton negotiating team were frustrated by what they saw as a lack of movement from the Palestinian delegation, although the willingness to accept some deviations from the 1967 borders was a notable step forward.

As much as it is important not to mythologize the Camp David negotiations it is similarly important not to do the same about the start of the Second Intifada. Whilst Ariel Sharon’s infamous visit to the Temple Mount/ Al Aqsa complex was clearly highly inflammatory, the Palestinian response was far from spontaneous protest to this event. Many observers believe the decision to start a Second Intifada was a tactical decision by Arafat in order to increase the pressure in forthcoming talks. However the main developments that followed on from the start of the Second Intifada and the concomitant increase in suicide attacks was to hasten the collapse of the Barak government and the Peace Process. In a last throw of the dice, with Barak facing defeat in a special Prime Ministerial election following the collapse of his government and Clinton in the last days of his Presidency, the sides met first at the White House then in Taba in Egypt. These negotiations would bring both sides closer than ever but ultimately ended in failure.

President Clinton, though angry at the failure of the negotiations outlined the areas where he believed there to be agreement between the parties and how a final status solution would eventually be comprised. Although soon after Taba both sides retreated from support for these ideas, the ‘Clinton Parameters’ would later form the basis for the civil society negotiated ‘Geneva Accords’ and in the view of TUFI continue to be an important guide to any achievable two-state solution.

The Clinton Parameters

• The creation of a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state based on Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank (94-96%) and the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocks maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annex to create a geographically contiguous Palestinian state. The land annexed by Israel would be compensated by transfer of Israeli territory (1-3% in initial proposals) to the Palestinians in a land swap.
• A solution for the Palestinian Refugees situation recognizing their suffering since 1948 and allowing them to return to a Palestinian state. Alternatively those wishing to stay in their current locations or in third countries including Israel, should be able to do so, consistent with those countries' sovereign decisions. All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses, and assistance in building new lives. No unlimited right of return to present day Israel.
• Israeli security guarantees that need not and should not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian territorial integrity. A non-militarized Palestine with an international presence in Palestine to provide border security along the Jordan Valley.
• Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all. It should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine. Arab sections of the city should be Palestinian and Jewish should be Israeli with special measures for holy sites.
• An agreement will have to mark the end of the conflict, with the termination of outstanding demands.

Ariel Sharon and the ‘Road Map’

Ariel Sharon was elected in January 2001 in a landslide victory over Ehud Barak by 62% to 38%. Once Prime Minister, Sharon moved to distance Israel from the positions taken at Camp David and Taba and tried to bring an end to the wave of suicide bombings taking place by imposing severe security clamp downs in the West Bank and Gaza and by striking at PA institutions said to be involved in the attacks. The Intifada has led to the deaths of over 1000 Israeli’s and approximately 3700 Palestinians to date.

During the first year and a half of the Bush Presidency the US administration took an arms length approach to the conflict. However it began to engage in late 2002 with the newly formed Middle East ‘Quartet’ comprising the US, EU, Russia and the UN. The resumption of talks was heavily influenced by the preparations for the 2003 Iraq war and led to the creation of what was called ‘A Performance- Based Road Map To A Permanent Two-State Solution To The Israel-Palestinian Conflict’.

The ‘Road Map’ was designed to operate in three phases with the aim of reaching a final status agreement by the end of 2005. The first stage until May 2003 aimed to bring about an end to the violence, a freeze of settlement building, rebuilding of Palestinian institutions and a resumption of Israeli/Palestinian security co-operation. The second stage involved a fresh round of Palestinian elections and an international conference leading to the creation of an interim Palestinian state with provisional borders. The final phase scheduled to take place in 2004-5 would have meant a return to final status talks and a resolution by the end of 2005. Following heavy international pressure the post of PA Prime Minister was created and filled by veteran moderate Mahmoud Abbas on March 19th 2003 with the aim of implementing Road Map commitments that the international community felt President Arafat was unable to fulfil.

However neither side fulfilled their commitments under Phase I and as such the plan has stalled, with all deadlines missed. Mahmoud Abbas resigned as Palestinian Prime Minister on September 6th 2003 in protest at President Arafat over the lack of control he was able to exercise over Palestinian Security forces in order to implement commitments under Phase I and was replaced by Ahmed Queri.

Gaza Disengagement, Arafat and Sharon

Despite the continuing violence the diplomatic stagnation was broken by two major events in 2004: the shock decision by Ariel Sharon to support a unilateral withdrawal of settlers from the Gaza Strip and Northern West Bank and the death of President Arafat. Sharon announced his disengagement plan at the 2004 Hertzalia conference, confounding his traditional supporters in the settler movement by adopting a plan that he had rejected in the 2003 election when it was proposed by Labor. Sharon faced down major opposition within his Likud party including defeat in an internal referendum and large scale public protests before its implementation in Summer 2005. Settlers were removed from the strip in August with full withdrawal on September 12th and the full disengagement from the four Northern West Bank settlements ten days later.

President Arafat died in a Paris hospital on November 11th 2004 as the result of an unknown illness. After a brief interregnum where the Legislative Council speaker Rauhi Fattouh held the Presidency, Mahmoud Abbas was elected the new President of the Palestinian Authority. Abbas’s election led to increased optimism that a return to the Road Map and negotiations might be possible. However despite his popular mandate Abbas struggled to assert full control over Palestinian insitutions and factions, whilst Sharon was unwilling to deal with Abbas, prefering unilateral options. Despite this Sharon and Abbas met on Feburay 8th 2005 at the Sharm El Sheik Summit marking a formal truce between Israel and the PA. Abbas achieved some success by persuading Hamas to sign up to a Tadihya, (calm) in March 2005, however Islamic Jihad and other groups such as the Popular Resistance Committee’s in Gaza did not agree to the proposal. Continuing violence by these groups played a crucial role in undermining hopes for progress following the Gaza withdrawal as Qassam rocket attacks on Southern Israel increased. Though personally popular amongst Palestinians, Abbas’s Fatah party that had dominated Palestinian politics for fourty years, lost ground to Hamas in local elections, percieved as divided and corrupt. On December 10th 2005, only a month after leaving Likud to found the Kadima Party, Ariel Sharon fell into a coma from which he has not recovered, and was replaced by his deputy Ehud Olmert.

On 25th January 2006 the first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in ten years took place, with a shock result. Hamas defeated Fatah by a margin of 74 seats in the 120 member PLC. Despite hopes that either a technocratic or a broad Hamas-Fatah government would be formed, Hamas’ Ismail Hanieh was chosen to become Prime Minister leading Hamas cabinet without external involvement. The response from the international community was the suspension of direct aid to the PA, whilst Israel withheld customs revenues combining to create a funding crisis that severely damaged the Palestinian economy and prevented the payment of many public sector workers. Qassam rocket firing into Israel increased as did Israeli artillery fire at areas believed to be used for Qassam firing during this period, leading to a significant number of civilian casualties. In Israeli elections on March 28th 2006 Kadima, the centerist party founded by Ariel Sharon, formed a government led by Ehud Olmert on a platform of further unilateral withdrawls from the West Bank.

Hamas ended it’s ceasefire on 9th June following the killing of a Gazan family picnicing on the beach. It resumed Qassam firing and on June 25th tunneled into Southern Israel for a surprise attack on an Israeli Army base killing two soliders and kidnapping Corporal Gilad Shalit. In a response to the kidnapping Israel launched ‘Operation Summer Rains’ re-entering the Gaza Strip for the first time since disengagement with the aim of recovering Corporal Shalit and preventing further rocket attacks. The operation has been heavily critised for the civilian casualties caused and the effect on Gaza’s infrastructure. However despite the upsurge in violence, an intiative by Fatah and Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails may prove critical in the long term hopes for peace. The document reaffirms the PLO as the sole representative body of the Palestinian people, calls for a Palestinian State to be created on the 1967 borders and for the ‘focusing’ of resistance in the occupiued territories. After weeks of public debate and facing the threat by President Abbas of a referendum the Hamas leadership signed upto the document on June 27th 2006. Although Hamas have been keen to stress that this does not mean an implict acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, it does give President Abbas the authority to negotiate with Israel and end months of internal Palestinian unrest that had threatened to become civil war.