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Understanding Hamas: Past, Present and Future

Since its shock win in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections the international community has been trying to come to terms with what type of organisation Hamas is and trying to work out how to respond to the new political reality in Palestine. This briefing seeks to give readers information about Hamas and the effects of its recent victory.

Hamas’ History

Hamas, also known by its full title Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), was founded in 1987 as the Gaza wing of the Pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood organisation by Sheik Ahmed Ismail Yassin and Abdel Rantissi. However it soon developed into an independent organisation with its main political strength in Gaza with elements of its political leadership in exile in Damascus (Syria).

The Hamas charter, published in 1988 as, ‘The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement’, outlines its aims and operating strategy. This document is riddled with hatred towards Israel and Jews more generally whilst arguing for the creation of an Islamic state in the entirety of what was British Mandate Palestine. (Click here for full text of the Covenant)

Concerning quotes from the Covenant include:

• “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it" (Preamble)

• “The Day of Judgement will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Muslims, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.” (Article 7)

• “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours.” (Article 13)

• “(Zionism) relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups…..It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion.” (Article 28)

• “The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"(-an antisemitic Tzarist Forgery that claimed Jews were trying to control the world), and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying. Leaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who does that.” (Article 32)

Hamas’ first known attack was the kidnapping and killing of Sgt Avi Sasportas on February 16th 1989. Hamas, who formed their military wing the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 1992, conducted knife attacks, shootings and a car bomb, before their first suicide bombing on April 16th 1993. Hamas were strident in their opposition to the September 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). During the peace negotiations in the period between September 1993 and September 1995 Hamas is believed to be responsible for 25 terrorist attacks of varying nature killing 47 Israelis and leaving many more injured.

Hamas played a major role in the wave of suicide bombings and other attacks that took place in early 1996. In February & March 1996 Hamas killed 47 Israelis in attacks that included two major bus bombings, a month after assassination of Hamas’ main bomb maker Yahya Ayyash, known as the engineer, in January 1996. These terrorist attacks are seen as having played a major role in the defeat of Shimon Peres and the ‘peace camp’ in the 1996 Israeli election, leading to the election of the right wing Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu.

Hamas played a major role in the wave of terrorist attacks that occurred during the second Intifada. The most notorious attacks include the 2001 attack on The Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv that killed 21 and wounded 130 and the 2002 Passover bombing at the Park Hotel in Netanyha that killed 30 and injured 150 Israelis. In 2004 Israel assassinated Hamas’ spiritual and political leaders Sheik Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi.

Hamas observed a period of ‘tahdia’(calm) refraining from direct participation in terrorist attacks from Feburary 2005 until June 2006, this followed the call made by President Abbas to all Palestinian Organisations to refrain from attacks and a heavy toll on its leadership and infrastructure from Israeli forces. Instead Hamas focused on boosting its popularity prior to its successful January 2006 election campaign. In all Hamas have claimed the lives of nearly 400 people and injured over 2,400 since 1994, though it is important to note that many other organisations committed terrorist attacks in addition to Hamas. The Hamas Izz ad-Din al- Qassam Brigades remain a proscribed terrorist group by the UK Government and Hamas is proscribed in its entirety by the EU.

Hamas and the Peace Process

Hamas’ stunning political victory in the January 2006 came not only as a shock to Israel and the international community but also to Hamas. Hamas, under the name ‘Change and Reform’, campaigned on a platform that attacked corruption and mismanagement within the PA and did not explicitly call for the destruction of Israel, although they remained heavily critical of Fatah’s approach to the Peace Process. Yet it seems unlikely that Hamas were actually expecting to win, rather believing that become they would be the main opposition with a real say in decision making. Since their election a debate seems to be taking place within Hamas about its strategy.

There are definite differences in language used between those seen as hard-liners such as Damascus based political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal, and the PA Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh who is seen as more of a pragmatist. There are also claims Hamas spokesmen are giving more moderate messages to English speaking media than to the Arab press.

Both Meshaal and Mahmoud Zahar, now the PA’s foreign minister, have repeatedly denied that they would ever be able to accept the existence of Israel on land they consider Waqf, an inalienable religious endowment therefore not in their gift to bargin away. Zahar stated that “we can expect to establish our independent state on the area before ‘67 and we can give a long-term Hudna (ceasefire).” Haniyeh has stated on May 23rd that the Hamas position is "if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, peace will prevail and we will implement a cease-fire [hudna] for many years," Israel understandably sees the suggestion of a long–term ceasefire as a ploy that Hamas would use inorder to arm itself for further attacks on Israel.

From both the radical and pragmatic wings of Hamas, the initial bargaining position is clear: that full withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 including East Jerusalem and full right of return to Israel for the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war is the pre-condition for any formal negotiations, until that point it will not recognise or negotiate with Israel or disarm. If Israel were to comply with these demands, Hamas would then be able to offer it a long-term ceasefire (Hudna). Not only is this proposed solution unacceptable to Israel and the international community it clearly inverts the principle that negotiations should take place between sides that recognise each others right to exist as negotiating partners in order to achieve a mutually agreed solution. In effect Hamas has set as pre-conditions to peace negotiations the entire list of demands that the Fatah led PLO had been arguing for as its final settlement but without the offer of a permanent peace.

Hamas’ belated acceptance of the ‘prisoners document’, written by Fatah and Hamas prisoners outlining the creation of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, is a continuation of this approach. The decision was taken to avoid a referendum defeat and prevent further infighting between Fatah and Hamas supporters. However Hamas ministers were at pains to stress that their acceptance of the plan should not be seen as an implicit recognition of the state of Israel, merely that a Palestinian state should be initially created in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas acceptance of the document is an important step however as it reaffirms the primacy of the PLO as the sole negotiating body for the Palestinian people.

It is true that Israel has also made demands on Hamas that, as a pre-condition for peace negotiations, Hamas accepts Israel’s right to exist and brings an end to its terrorist activities. Without the acceptance of the right of both parties to exist, negotiation can not produce any secure and permanent outcomes. It is important to note that until recently there has been an on going low level contact between Israeli security officials and locally elected Hamas members over day to day matters below the political radar, but any formal dialogue has been prevented by the points raised above. However Israel’s government has suspended direct contact with Palestinian institutions controlled by Hamas whilst maintaining dialogue with President Abbas.

The majority of Israeli’s, Kadima, the Labor Party and Meretz all accept the right in principle for a Palestinian State to exist. Prime Minster Ehud Olmert told January 2006’s Herzliya Conference ‘It is important to be clear: we are interested in neighbourly relations which are good, productive and progressive. We support the establishment of a modern, democratic Palestinian state which respects civil rights, and is economically prosperous. Their welfare is our welfare, their well-being is our well-being, their stability is our stability’. Since its election the Israeli government has stated that it wants to proceed on the basis of negotiations with President Abbas but that if negotiations are not possible in the next few years it would proceed with the removal of some West Bank settlements unilaterally. Following discussions of with world leaders Olmert has suggested that Israel will withdraw from 90% of the West Bank and negotiate with the Palestinians over the status of the remaining 10% of the land. It is clear that although Olmert believes in the concept of a Palestinian state, the details of what he envisages are unclear as they have not produced any concrete proposals for his ‘plan’. There have however been some statements suggesting components of a potential plan such as retaining a temporary Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley that would be damaging. However in a political vacuum, without negotiations where the option of meaningful peace is on the table, there is no incentive for Israel to move any further than dictated by its most narrow interests. There are of course those on the right in Israel who seek to postpone the discussion of a Palestinian State until full peace and security for Israel have been achieved and those on the far right who oppose the concept of a Palestinian State in any form, but it is clear that at present there is a significant and durable public support for a Palestinian State amongst Israelis.

The desire for peace and a negotiated settlement remains strong amongst Palestinians, despite the Hamas victory. In a February 2006 poll of 1200 Palestinians conducted by the Ramallah-based Near East Consulting Institute it seems clear that the election of Hamas is not replicated by a wider desire amongst the Palestinians for the eventual destruction of Israel. Rather than indicate backing for Hamas' tactics, the survey found that 73% of respondents believed that Hamas should "change its position on the elimination of the state of Israel". Not only did an overall 84% support a peace agreement with Israel, but 77% of Hamas voters also wanted a settlement with the Israelis.

Hamas Today

Hamas was elected in a free and fair election and the new government should be recognised as the government of the Palestinian Authority, although noting the primacy of the Presidency in the Palestinian political system. The international community must maintain opportunities for dialogue with the new Hamas led PA to attempt to find areas where progress can be made. But despite recognizing Hamas’ victory, the international community retains the right to adapt its policies towards the PA as a result of the policies of the new Hamas administration and make clear to that its positions towards Israel, terrorism and the peace process are unacceptable to the international community and that this has diplomatic consequences.

The EU and US suspended direct aid by to the PA in April as a result of the diplomatic deadlock. That combined with the Israeli suspension of tax transfers (see below) has led to a serious financial crisis in Palestine and the non-payment of many public sector workers for several months. In 2005 over 67% of international aid to Palestine was delivered through a range of different NGOs and international agencies including the World Bank and UNRWA, with the remainder given to the PA. It should be noted that prior to the election of Hamas, donors were diverting fund away from the previous Fatah PA administration over the issue of corruption to other methods of development assistance. In developing countries all over the world donors decide the best method of delivering development aid, dependent on the nature of the government of the country and the conditions on the ground. Both the EU and the US have decided that until Hamas recognises Israel, renounces violence and ensures funds are not diverted to fund terrorism or makes significant steps towards these goals that aid should not go directly to Hamas controlled bodies.

One of the most controversial aspects of Israel’s recent policy towards the Hamas led Palestinian Authority (PA) has been its freezing of tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority. Under the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (known as Oslo II) Israel agreed to collect import duties, VAT for Israeli goods purchased by Palestinians and income tax from Palestinians working in Israel and transfer the funds to the PA. This is important as all imports to the PA come through Israel and a sizable amount of goods purchased by Palestinians outside of PA controlled areas are bought in Israel. These sources had created a monthly transfer of funds to the PA of, on average, $50-55 million per month.

Since Hamas legislators took their seats in the PLC, Israel has suspended these transfers to the PA, instead placing the money in an account at the Bank of Israel to be paid to the PA once the situation improves. This move has caused significant damage to the already parlous state of the PA’s finances. Israel argues that the new Hamas led PA administration, which rejects the Oslo agreements in principle, is in breach of the agreement that allows for the transfers and that it will not help fund a government that might use proceeds for terrorist activities. Palestinians argue that freezing the transfers is theft of money that should be going to the PA. Recently Israel has announced that a proportion of this money would be used to directly pay for services including electricity, water, oil and some healthcare that the PA had previously paid Israeli companies for from its funds. However it is clear that more needs to be done to resolve this issue that the EU described as ‘essential in averting a crisis in the Palestinian territories’.

Continued development support to Palestine remains critical to reducing the economic hardships facing the Palestinian population and preventing further deterioration in the security situation. Similarly whilst at present it may be important for donors to use other mechanisms to help support services to the Palestinian people, it is essential that the PA does not cease to function, as collapse would entail major security concerns for Israel and would be a disaster for the Palestinians. On May 9th the Quartet (the EU, US, Russia and the UN) agreed to the creation of a temporary international facility to enable support for the Palestinian public sector without giving money directly to the PA. This scheme has been providing support for medical services and providing some welfare payments but it has not prevented many Palestinian workers from going without their wages.

Hamas officially ended its ceasefire after a period of mounting violence on June 10th that had seen a steady increase in Qassam fire into Southern Israel from other Palestinian groups and civilian deaths as a result of Israeli shelling on areas believed to have used for firing rockets. Hamas stated the decision was taken after the killing of a family on the beach in Gaza. Hamas has fired several hundred Qassams into Southern Israel in recent months. On June 25th in a major escalation to the conflict Hamas led the capture of an Israeli soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit from the Israeli side of the border. Israel responded by re-entering Gaza, attacking Hamas targets and arresting Hamas legislators in the West Bank. This military offensive has led to the most intense clashes in Palestine for several years, with further damage to infrastructure and high numbers of casualties.