Trade Union Friends of Israel

Key Points
• The Security Barrier should not be built beyond Israel’s 1967 borders. Deviations from the ‘green line’ have caused significant hardship for Palestinians and additional security concerns for Israelis.
• It has played an important role in helping prevent the killing of innocent Israeli Civilians by terrorist attacks but it does not negate the real need for the Palestinian Authority to control terrorist groups operating from its areas.
• It must not be used as a ‘fact on the ground’ in any future peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians.

The construction of Israel’s security barrier remains one of the most controversial developments to face the region in recent years. The security barrier is called many other names: the security fence, the separation fence, the separation barrier, the wall, the separation wall and the Apartheid wall just to name a few. It is hailed by supporters who see it as having significantly reduced number of successful suicide attacks and is reviled by critics who attack its effect on the lives of Palestinians. It is an issue that provokes claim and counter claim. This briefing seeks to give an overview of the issue and assess its significant security and human rights impact.

Why was it Constructed?

The idea of a security barrier between Israel and the Palestinian Territories was first seriously put forward by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, as a way of protecting Israeli citizens from terrorist attack and providing Palestinians with clear demarcation of their borders. This proposal was first put into action in Gaza in 1994, where a barrier was built along the 1948 armistice lines (the Green Line), separating Gaza from Israel. This barrier has proved far less controversial than the West Bank Barrier due to its adherence to the Green Line that was Israel’s defacto border from before the 1967 ‘Six Day’ War, seen by the majority of the international community as the legitimate basis for its final borders. (Prior to 1967 none of Israel’s neighbours recognised these borders, however today they are accepted by Egypt and Jordan as the result of peace treaties).

The idea of a security barrier for the West Bank was taken up by Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2000 however his election defeat prevented such a plan being brought into action. Barak’s successor Ariel Sharon, though initially skeptical, moved to make the West Bank barrier a reality following the wave of terrorist attacks that followed the declaration of the Second Intifada in September 2000. The security barrier has been built in stages and is not yet complete. However it is widely believed to have played a major role in reducing the number of suicide attacks within Israel. Israel’s security services have found that the chance of a suicide bomber successfully reaching their target is greatly reduced the further they have to travel. Previously, many successful bombers were able to travel a few miles to their targets from bases in the West Bank. In many areas as a result of the security barrier this is no longer possible and the detection rate of attempted bombers has increased dramatically. This progress may in time lead to reduced tensions by reducing IDF incursions into occupied territory that normally follow a successful suicide attack. However this improved security for Israel has come at a major cost for Palestinians, separating many from their land and reducing freedom of movement.

What is it made of?

Once complete, for 94% of its projected length the security barrier will consist of a combination of 10ft chain link fence, barbed wire, a 6-8ft ditch, security cameras and a patrol road, with guard posts at intervals along the route. Yet this is not the image that most people associate with the security barrier- the Wall. In some sections close to built up areas or major roads the security barrier takes the form of a concrete wall, approximately 8.5m high. The security rationale behind this is to make it more difficult for terrorists to shoot at targets on the Israeli side of the barrier. This however requires a structure which is far more imposing and which has had a far greater impact in media reports. Once the Security barrier is completed, approximately 6% of the barrier will take this form. Regardless of its composition its purpose is as a barrier to prevent movement, that effects both suicide bombers and civilians. So the real answer to the at times vicious debate over whether the barrier is a wall or a fence is that it is both, mostly fence but partially wall.

What is the Route?

Some of the most important concerns surrounding the barrier project relate to its route. The route of the barrier partially follows the ‘green line’, the pre-1967 borders, however it does make deviations, some small in order to accommodate local topography, some large to protect major Israeli settlement blocks built in the West Bank. It is these deviations from the green line, more so than the barrier itself, which are responsible for the controversy and humanitarian issues surrounding the project.

There has been a great degree of debate within Israel over the barriers route and on February 18th 2005 the Israeli cabinet approved a new route for the barrier that reduced the route’s deviation into the West Bank. However this new route has been altered following Israeli Supreme Court Judgments and further cabinet decisions. The barrier was severely criticised in a ruling by the International Court of Justice, with its route ruled contrary to international law. Israeli disputes this decision claiming that the ICJ wrongly argued that Article 51 of the UN Charter, the main basis for Israel’s legal case only applies to the actions of states. Article 51 states ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’

A series of Israeli Supreme Court rulings over the past two years in cases brought by Palestinians and Israeli Human Rights groups have firmly established the principle in Israeli law that the barrier is only legal as a security measure, if the disruption caused to Palestinians is proportionate to the security threat to Israel. These rulings have caused route of the barrier to be further redrawn taking these concerns into account and there are further court cases pending. Yet the route does still deviate markedly from the 1967 borders and has a major impact on Palestinians living in the areas surrounding it.

According to the Israeli Human Rights Group B’Tselem in October 2005 31% of the barrier in key areas had been completed, with 16.5% under construction, with the remainder yet to be built. It suggests that under plans confirmed 5.8% of the West Bank would be on the Western Side of the Barrier, with a further 3.7% depending on further approval (up to a total of 9.5% if no further changes are implemented), whilst the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) argues that the final figure is closer to 7%. If fully implemented the barrier might place up to 30,500 Palestinians on the western side of the barrier, at present this affects over 10,000 Palestinians according to the MFA. According to B’Tselem If fully completed the barrier would run for a length of 681km (423 miles).

Prior to the February 2005 announcement there had been fears that Israel would attempt to use the barrier to encircle the Palestinian Authority areas, separating it from the Jordan Valley, this has happened. Despite concerning statements made by Ehud Olmert during the election that Israel may need to maintain a military presence in the Jordan Valley to ensure border security (the Barak administration had accepted the ‘Clinton parameters’ that would use an international rather than Israeli presence to ensure this) there remain no stated plans to change the barrier route to achieve this. Any move to build an eastern barrier would be extremely controversial and would undermine the territorial integrity of a future Palestinian state significantly reducing the prospects for a full peace agreement.
The Israeli Government insists that the barrier is not meant to be a permanent border, or to create ‘facts on the ground’, but that it can be moved in the context of peaceful negotiations and that barrier route has all ready been moved in response to the Israeli High Court Judgments. Yet given the tendency for temporary structures around the world to become permanent Palestinian anxiety is understandable. There is already considerable political discussion in Israel that the Barrier might form the basis of a future border with a Palestinian state.
The current UK policy on Israel’s security barrier is very clear. Former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, “We have no objection to the construction of a barrier to protect civilians on condition that it is built on internationally acknowledged borders or within Israeli territory. But we believe that the construction of this barrier on occupied territory, with the destruction of property and hardship that it entails, is unlawful.” This TUFI believes this analysis is fair however it is important to note that many people in Israel argue that the state should protect civilian settlers using the barrier until a final status solution to the conflict is reached.

The Barrier and the peace process

Though there is a broad international consensus that territory captured by Israel in 1967 is occupied and that Security Council resolutions call for territory to be relinquished as part of a peace deal, all legally binding UN resolutions deliberately avoid specifying future boundaries, acknowledging that precise borders will be the subject of bilateral negotiations.

Some in Israel argue that as many settlers live on 5% of the land very close to the green line it may be possible to incorporate many of these people on the western side of a future border in return for a land swap program where land in Israel (or even a trilateral deal with Egypt) would be given to the Palestinians in return. Land Swaps were proposed at by President Clinton in 2000 as part of the failed final status negotiations at Camp David and Taba negotiations and accepted in principle by then Israeli Prime Minister Barak. The principle has been taken up by the Palestinian and Israeli drafters of the 2003 Geneva Accords and may yet provide a potential solution to the problem. For any hope of agreement between both sides future negotiations must be firmly based on, but not exclusively tied to, the acceptance of the pre-1967 borders.